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STATEMENT OF CASE 
THE PETITIONER FILED FOR DIVORCE ON THE 31ST DAY OF 
DECEMBER/ 1981, (DISTRICT COURT INDEX #2,, HEREAFTER 
REFERRED TO AS DCI). ON THE 26TH DAY OF AUGUST, 1982 THE 
DIVORCE WAS GRANTED TO BECOME EFFECTIVE AFTER THE 3"MONTH 
INTERLOCUTORY PERIOD (DCI# 12-14). PETITIONER AGREED BY 
STIPULATION TO PAY TO RESPONDENT, THE SUM OF $250.00 PER 
MONTH AS CHILD SUPPORT, A SUM THAT WAS EQUAL TO 75% 
OF PETITIONER GROSS INCOME (DCI#7~10). 
ON THE SEPTEMBER 29, 1982 PETITIONER FILED FOR 
PROTECTION UNDER CHAPTER 7 OF THE FEDERAL BANKRUPTCY ACT. 
ON THE OCTOBER 12, 1982, RESPONDENT FILED A ORDER TO 
SHOW CAUSE, (DCI# 20). IN SAID ORDER RESPONDENT ASKED THE 
COURT TO HOLD THE PETITIONER IN CONTEMPT. THIS WAS DONE 
BEFORE THE DIVORCE BECAME FINAL AND WHILE THE PETITIONER WAS 
UNDER THE PROTECTION OF THE FEDERAL BANKRUPTCY ACT. 
AFTER THE PETITIONER'S BANKRUPTCY WAS DISCHARGED HE 
PAID THE RESPONDENT ALL PAST DUE CHILD SUPPORT. 
ON THE SEPTEMBER 27, 1982, RESPONDENT FILED A ORDER TO 
SHOW CAUSE (DCI# 40), ASKING THE COURT AGAIN TO FIND 
RESPONDENT IN CONTEMPT. THE CONTEMPT INVOLVED THE PROPERTY 
SETTLEMENT AND WAS PREVIOUSLY DISCHARGED IN THE BANKRUPTCY. 
SAID O.S.C. WAS STRICKEN ON THE 8TH DAY OF DECEMBER, 1983 
(DCI# 47). PETITIONER AGREED TO PAY THE PAST DEBT AND A 
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ORDER CONFORMING TO THE AGREEMENT BETWEEN PARTIES WAS SIGNED 
BY THE COURT ON THE 7TH DAY OF FEBRUARY 1984 (DCI# 5 3 " 5 5 ) . 
ON THE APRIL 20> 1984 PETITIONER FILED A MOTION TO 
AMEND THE DIVORCE DECREE TO ALLOW THE PETITIONER TO EXPAND 
HIS VISITATION BECAUSE RESPONDENT UNREASONABLY WAS DENYING 
HIM REASONABLE VISITATION (DCI# 6 0 ) . SAID MOTION WAS 
STIPULATED TO AND THE ORDER GRANTING SAID REQUEST WAS SIGNED 
ON THE 21ST OF JUNE 1984 (DCI# 65"67) 
ON AUGUST 6> 1985 PETITIONER FILED A ORDER TO SHOW 
CAUSE BECAUSE RESPONDENT WAS DENYING HIM VISITATION WITH HIS 
DAUGHTER (DCI# 6 8 ) . RESPONDENT AGREED TO ALLOW VISITATION TO 
RESUME AND THE 0.S.C WAS STRICKEN. 
ON MARCH 27, 1986* RESPONDENT FILED A ORDER TO SHOW 
CAUSE AND PETITION FOR MODIFICATION (DCI# 71 & 74-85). IN 
THESE MOTIONS AND ORDERS RESPONDENT WANTED THE COURT TO HOLD 
THE PETITIONER IN CONTEMPT AND TO DENY HIS VISITATION WITH 
HIS DAUGHTERI UNTIL HE PAID THE PAST DUE CHILD SUPPORT 
PAYMENTS; AND THEN TO RESTRICT PETITONERS'S FUTURE 
VISITATION. JUDGE FISHLER DENIED RESPONDENT REQUESTS AND 
ALLOWED THE PETITIONER TO FILE A PETITION TO REDUCE CHILD 
SUPPORT PAYMENT AND STAYED ANY CONTEMPT PROCEEDING AGAINST 
PETITIONER UNTIL A REVIEW OF THE ABILITY OF THE PETITIONER 
TO PAY SUPPORT IS ACCESSED. THE PETITIONER WAS PAYING THE 
RESPONDENT BETWEEN $200.00 AND $400.00 PER MONTH WHEN THE 
RESPONDENT FILED HER O.S.C. (DCI# 8 1 ~ 8 2 ) . 
JUDGE FISHLER WAS SO OFFENDED BY THE RESPONDENT AND HER 
ATTORNEY THAT HE RECUSED HIMSELF AND ASSIGNED THIS CASE TO 
JUDGE SAWAYA (DCI# 84). 
ON APRIL 14; 1986, PETITIONER FILED HIS 
COUNTER-PETITION FOR MODIFICATION OF DIVORCE DECREE (DCI# 
87-88). 
ON APRIL 22, 1986, JUDGE SAWAYA SIGNED THE ORDER OF 
JUDGE FISHLER IN WHICH #2 OF THE JUDGEMENT STATES "THE 
ISSUED OF CONTEMPT AGAINST PLAINTIFF FOR HIS FAILURE TO PAY 
JUDGEMENTS AND OBLIGATION IS RESERVED UNTIL THE HEARING ON A 
PETITION BY PLAINTIFF FOR MODIFICATION OF THE DECREE OF 
DIVORCE WHICH WILL ADDRESS THE ISSUE OF THE PLAINTIFF'S 
ABILITY TO PAY SAID JUDGEMENTS." (DCI# 95"9) 
ON OCTOBER 14, 1986 THE PETITIONER ATTEMPTED TO PROCEED 
WITH HIS PETITION TO MODIFY BY FILING A REQUEST FOR TRIAL 
SETTING. (DCI# 101). 
COMMISSIONER SANDRA PEULAR SET A PRE-TRIAL SETTLEMENT 
FOR FEBRUARY 13, 1987. (DCI# 104) 
RESPONDENT RESISTED ANY SETTLEMENT AND FILED OBJECTION 
TO REQUEST FOR TRIAL SETTING. (DCI# 105). 
ON MARCH 17, 1988 PETITIONER WAS BEING DENIED HIS 
VISITATION AND FILED A ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE TO FORCE 
RESPONDENT TO ALLOW HIS VISITATION WITH HIS DAUGHTER. (DCI# 
111-2). 
RESPONDENT CLAIMED IT WAS UNFAIR THAT SHE COULD BE 
CALLED TO COURT TO ANSWER FOR DENYING VISITATION WHEN 
PETITIONER WAS DELINQUENT IN HIS CHILD SUPPORT PAYMENTS. 
(DCI# 125). 
ON 18, APRIL, 1988 COMMISSIONER PEULER FOUND NO 
CONTEMPT OF THE PETITIONER AT THIS TIME AND RESPONDENT 
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PROMISED TO ALLOW PETITIONER HIS VISITATION FROM NOW ON. 
(DCI# 129). 
ON MAY 6, 1988» RESPONDENT FILED A ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE 
AND REQUESTED THAT THE PLAINTIFF PAY THE FULL AMOUNT OF HER 
ATTORNEY FEESI BEGIN MAKING CHILD SUPPORT PAYMENTS WITH A 
WEEKLY REDUCTION OF THE JUDGEMENT* AND THAT PLAINTIFF BE 
ADVISED THAT IF HE DOES NOT COMPLY HE WILL BE ARRESTED AND 
JAILED UNTIL HE IS WILLING TO COMPLY. (DCI# 135). RESPONDENT 
FILED AT THE SAME TIME A PETITION TO DENY PETITIONER 
ALTERNATE FRIDAY VISITS. (DCI# 140) 
AFTER SEVERAL DELAYS AND CONTINUANCES RESPONDENT'S 
O.S.C. CAME BEFORE JUDGE SAWAYA ON OCTOBER 3; 1988. 
PETITIONER AND HIS ATTORNEY WERE WILLING TO STIPULATE TO THE 
CONDITIONS OF THE O . S . C . HOWEVER JUDGE SAWAYA MADE HIS OWN 
MOTION AND ORDERED IT BE HEARD AT THE END OF HIS LAW AND 
MOTION CALENDER THAT DAY. JUDGE SAWAYA THEN FOUND THE 
PETITIONER GUILTY OF CONTEMPT; SENTENCED HIM TO SERVED 30 
DAY IN THE COUNTY JAILI STAYED IMPOSITION OF JAIL SENTENCE 
FOR 60 DAYS TO ALLOW THE PETITONER TO PURGE THE CONTEMPT BY 
PAYING THE RESPONDENT A SIGNIFICANT AMOUNT OF MONEY. (DCI# 
170) 
DURING THE MONTH OF NOVEMBER OF 1989 THE PETITIONER 
SERVED HIS JAIL SENTENCE. 
ON FEBRUARY 24. 1990 RESPONDENT FILED A ORDER TO SHOW 
CAUSE* IN THIS O.S.C. RESPONDENT REQUESTED THE SUSPEND 
VISITATION OF PETITIONER UNTIL HE IS NOT IN CONTEMPT OF 
COURT AND PAYING HER SUPPORT. (DCI# 214) 
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ON APRIL 13, 1990 THE COURT CANCELED THE HEARING ON 
RESPONDENT'S O.S.C. AND RESPONDENT FILED A NOTICE OF 
CONTINUANCE. (DCI# 258) 
ON APRIL 24, 1990; THE PETITIONER APPEARED, AT. THE 
O.S.C. HEARING AND WAS TOLD ,BY , ITHE ^COURT CLERK ,,THAT .THE 
HEARING HAS BEEN J C A N C E L L E D ,AND THAT, THE .RESPONDENT WOULD 
HAVE TO SERVED THE PETITIONER WITH ,A NEW O.S.C* BEFORE ,,SHE 
COULD HAVE HER O.S.C. HEARD BY THE JUDGE. 
ON MAY 21 * 1990 THE RESPONDENT THOUGH HER ATTORNEYI 
ASKED JUDGE SAWAYA TO ISSUE A^BENCH WARRANT FOR THE ARREST 
OF THE PETITIONER BECAUSE HE HAD NOT SHOWN FOR THE O . S . C , 
THE PETITIONER HAD NOT BEEN SERVED WITH A NEW O.S.C. AND 
THEREFORE FELT HE DID NOT HAVE TO ATTEND, HOWEVERI 
PETITIONER KNEW OF JUDGE SAWAYA BIAS AGAINST HIM AND SENT 
RAY STODDARD, A ATTORNEY THAT HAD REPRESENTED HIM EARLY IN 
THIS CASE, TO INFORM JUDGE SAWAYA THAT PETITIONER HAD NOT 
BEEN- SERVED WITH THE O . S . C ' J A N D THAT THE PETITIONER AND HIS 
ATTORNEY COULD BE-IN JUDGE , SAWAYA COURT .ROOM , -WITHIN 15. 
MINUTES IF JUDGE SAWAYA WANTED TO HOLD THE,HEARING, JUDGE 
SAWAYA STATED THAT HE KNEW^WHAT WAS GOING ON AND THEN, ISSUED 
A NO BAIL BENCH WARRANT AGAINST PETITIONER. (DCI#I254) 
WHEN.MR. STODDARD TOLD THE PETITIONER OF JUDGE SAWAYA 
ACTIONS HE DIRECTED HIS ATTORNEY TO CONTACT JUDGE SAWAYA AND 
HAVE THE WARRANT RECALLED. ONLY AFTER JUDGE SAWAYA WAS SHOWN 
THE DOCKET PRINTOUT SHOWING THE CANCELLING OF THE O.S.C. 
HEARING DID JUDGE SAWAYA RECALL THE WARRANT, HOWEVER HE 
RULED THAT RESPONDENT DID NOT HAD TO SERVE THE PETITIONER 
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WITH A O.S.C. AND SET THE HEARING FOR JUNE 18, 1990. (DCI# 
256-9) 
ON JUNE 18, 1990 JUDGE SAWAYA FOUND THE PETITIONER 
GUILTY OF CONTEMPT* DENIED ALL CONTACT BETWEEN PETITIONER 
AND HIS DAUGHTER. SENTENCED THE PETITIONER TO SERVE 30 DAY 
IN THE COUNTY JAIL AND STAYED THE IMPOSITION OF THE JAIL 
SENTENCE FOR 30 DAY TO ALLOW THE PETITIONER TO PAY THE 
RESPONDENT SOME MONEY. (DCI# 262) 
ON JULY 13I 1990 JUDGE SAWAYA SIGNED A ORDER OVER THE 
TIMELY FILED OBJECTIONS OF THE PETITIONER. THOSE OBJECTIONS 
WERE NOT FRIVOLOUS NOR WERE FILED FILED AS A DELAYING 
TACTIC. (DCI# 268-71) 
ON JULY 16, 1990. PETITIONER FILED A AFFIDAVIT OF BIAS 
DIRECTED TOWARD THE BIAS CONDUCT OF JUDGE SAWAYA. AT THE 
HEARIN LATER THAT SAME DAY PETITIONER TOLD JUDGE SAWAYA THAT 
HE HAD FILED A AFFIDAVIT OF BAIS EARLIER AND ACCORDING THE 
THE RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURES HE COULD NO LONGER PROCEED 
UNTIL THE AFFIDAVIT OF BIAS WERE REVIEW BY THE PRESIDING 
JUDGE. JUDGE SAWAYA ACCEPT A COPY TO THE AFFIDAVIT BUT 
STATED HE WAS NOT BIAS AND THEN WHEN ON TO HOLD THE REVIEW 
HEARING. (DCI# 298) 
ON AUGUST 7, 1990, JUDGE MURPHY DENIED PETITIONER 
AFFIDAVIT OF BIAS. (DCI# 298) 
ON AUGUST 13, 1990 PETITIONER FILED A NOTICE OF APPEAL 
FOR BOTH THE JULY 13 ORDER OF JUDGE SAWAYA AND THE AUGUST 7 
ORDER DENYING THE AFFIDAVIT OF BIAS BY JUDGE MURPHY. (DCI# 
316) 
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ON OCTOBER 10; 1990; THE COURT OF APPEALS VACATED JUDGE 
SAWAYA ORDER AS IT RELATES TO VISITATION. 
ON JANUARY 9 1991 JUDGE SAWAYA SIGNED A AMENDED ORDER 
AGAIN DENYING PETITIONER VISITATION RIGHTS. 
PETITIONER THEN ASKED THE COURT OF APPEALS TO REVIEW 
THE JANUARY 9TH ORDER AND STAY THE EFFECT OF SAID UNTIL THE 
CASE COULD BE GIVING A FAIR HEARING. 
ON FEBRUARY 4, 1991; THE COURT OF APPEALS DENIED THE 
PETITIONER'S REQUEST FOR STAY. 




1. THE PETITIONER CONTENDS THAT THERE IS A 
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT OF A PARENT TO MAINTAIN A PERSONAL AND 
CLOSE RELATIONSHIP WITH THEIR CHILDREN. 
A PARENT HAS A "FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT; PROTECTED BY THE 
CONSTITUTION; TO SUSTAIN HIS RELATIONSHIP WITH HIS CHILD." 
STATE IN RE WALTER B., UTAH, 577 P.2ND 119, 124 (1978). 
IN MEYER V. NEBRASKA, 262 U.S. 590, 399, 43 S.CT. 625, 
626, 67 L.ED. 1042 (1923), THE SUPREME COURT INCLUDED FAMILY 
RELATIONSHIPS IN THE "LIBERTY" OF WHICH A STATE CANNOT 
DEPRIVE ANY PERSON WITHOUT DUE PROCESS OF LAW UNDER THE 
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION. 
THE RIGHTS INHERENT IN FAMILY 
RELATIONSHIPS-HUSBAND-WIFE, PARENT-CHILD AND SIBLING-ARE THE 
MOST OBVIOUS EXAMPLES OF RIGHTS RETAINED BY THE PEOPLE. THEY 
ARE "NATURAL," "INTRINSIC," OR "PRIOR" IN THE SENSE THAT OUR 
CONSTITUTIONS PRESUPPOSE THEM,...IN RE J.P., UTAH 648 P.2D 
1373. THIS PARENTAL RIGHT TRANSCENDS ALL PROPERTY AND 
ECONOMIC ' RIGHTS. I T IS ROOTED NOT IN STATE OR FEDERAL 
STATUTORY OR CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, TO WHICH IT IS LOGICALLY 
AND CHRONOLOGICALLY PRIOR, BUT IN IN NATURE AND HUMAN 
INSTINCT. SUPRA.8 1373. "...TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS 
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SOLELY ON THE BASIS OF THE CHILD'S BEST INTEREST AND WITHOUT 
ANY FINDING OF PARENTAL UNFITNESS; ABANDONMENT* OR 
SUBSTANTIAL NEGLECT; VIOLATES THE PARENT'S LIBERTY RIGHTS 
UNDER THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE OF THE UNITED STATES 
CONSTITUTION." SUPRA 8 1375 
THE ORDER OF JANUARY 9TH DID NOT FIND; AS REQUIRED 
ABOVE; ANY FINDING OF UNFITNESS; ABANDONMENT OR SUBSTANTIAL 
NEGLECT AND THEREFORE MUST BE FOUND IN CONTRADICTION WITH 
THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION AND BE OVERTURNED. 
2. THE PETITIONER NEXT CONTENDS THAT THE ORDER VIOLATES 
THE EIGHT AMENDMENT; OF THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION IN 
THAT IT CALL FOR CRUEL AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT. IT IS UNUSUAL 
BECAUSE NO OTHER COURT HAS EVER DENIED ALL CONTACT BETWEEN 
PARENT AND CHILD FOR THE REASON STATED IN THE FINDINGS OF 
FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW OF THIS ORDER. IT IS CRUEL 
BECAUSE IT DESTROYS A LOVING RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN PARENT AND 
CHILD AND IT ALLOWS THE CUSTODIAL PARENT TO TELL THE CHILD 
THAT HER FATHER DOES NOT LOVE HER ANYMORE BECAUSE IT DOES 
NOT WANT TO SEE HER ANYMORE; A FACT ALLEGED IN PETITIONER 
SUPPORTING AFFIDAVIT FOR STAY BEFORE THE COURT OF APPEALS 
AND LEFT UNCHALLENGED BY RESPONDENT AT THE HEARING OR ANY 
OTHER PLACE. 
3. THE PETITIONER CONTENDS THAT THE ORDER VIOLATES THE 
FOURTEEN AMENDMENT OF THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION; IN 
THAT HE HAS BEEN DENIED DUE PROCESS. UTAH LAW REQUIRES "A 
SUBSTANTIAL CHANGE IN CIRCUMSTANCES MUST BE FOUND BEFORE A 
CUSTODY DECREE IS MODIFIED." SMITH V. SMITH; 793 P.2D 409. 
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ALSO IN HQPGGE V. HQPGEE, 649 P.2D 51 (UTAH 1982), HODGEE 
HELD THAT A PARENT SEEKING A CHANCE IN CUSTODY OF A CHILD 
MUST FIRST ESTABLISH THAT THERE HAS BEEN A SUBSTANTIAL AND 
MATERIAL CHANGE IN THE CIRCUMSTANCES UPON WHICH THE ORIGINAL 
CUSTODY AWARD WAS BASED. 
IN ALL CASE, EXCEPT FOR THIS ONE, THE COURT HAS 
REQUIRED A PETITION TO MODIFY BEFORE CHANGING CUSTODIAL 
ARRANGEMENT, RESPONDENT HAS TRIED AND FAILED IN SEVERAL 
ATTEMPTS TO LIMIT THE VISITATION OF PETITIONER, THOUGH THE 
REGULAR PETITIONS TO MODIFY, NOW WITH ORDER TO SHOW TO 
CAUSE AS PUNISHMENT TO THE PETITIONER JUDGE SAWAYA HAS 
DENIED VISITATION RIGHTS AND IN EFFECT MODIFIED THE DIVORCE 
DECREE, DENYING THE PETITIONER HIS DUE PROCESS OF 
CHALLENGING THE ASSERTIONS AND PRESENTING HIS DEFENSES. 
JUDGE SAWAYA STATED IF HE FOUND THE NONPAYMENT OF CHILD 
WAS WILLFUL HE COULD TERMINATE VISITATION, (TRANSCRIPT OF 
JUNE 18, 1990, PAGES 37 LINES 23-25, PAGE 38 LINES 1-4). 
JUDGE TOOK NO EVIDENCE CONCERNING THE BEST INTEREST OF THE 
CHILD HOWEVER, IN THE JANUARY 9TH ORDER JUDGE SAWAYA FOUND 
IT WAS IN THE BEST INTEREST OF THE CHILD NOT TO HAVE ANY 
CONTACT WITH HER FARTHER, "BECAUSE THE FAILURE TO PAY CHILD 
SUPPORT HAS BEEN WILLFUL, THE COURT FINDS THAT PLAINTIFF 
DOES NOT, IN PART, RESPECT THE LEGAL SYSTEM OR THE LAW 
REQUIRING PAYMENT OF CHILD SUPPORT. FOR THAT REASON, THE 
COURT FINDS THAT PLAINTIFF'S ATTITUDES AND BEHAVIORS ARE 
ANTI-SOCIAL AND CONSTITUTES A SUBSTANTIAL DEVIATION FROM THE 
MORAL NORMS OF SOCIETY*. (FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS 
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OF LAW RE: JANUARY 9, 1991 ORDER). THUS JUDGE SAWAYA BY NOT 
REQUIRING THE RESPONDENT TO FOLLOW THE STATUTORIAL PROCEDURE 
AND PRESENT HER EVIDENCE AND ALLOW THE PETITIONER TO COUNTER 
WITH HIS DEFENSES AND EVIDENCE DENIED PETITIONER HIS DUE 
PROCESS OF LAW. 
4. THE PETITIONER CONTENDS THAT THE ORDER OF JANUARY 
VIOLATES THE FLRST AMENDMENT OF THE UNITED STATES 
CONSTITUTION. "BECAUSE THE FAILURE TO PAY CHILD SUPPORT " HAS 
BEEN WILLFULI THE COURT FINDS THAT PLAINTIFF DOES NOT; IN 
PART. RESPECT THE LEGAL SYSTEM OR THE LAW REQUIRING PAYMENT 
OF CHILD SUPPORT. FOR THAT REASON; THE COURT FINDS THAT 
PLAINTIFF'S ATTITUDES AND BEHAVIORS ARE ANTI-SOCIAL AND 
CONSTITUTES A SUBSTANTIAL DEVIATION FROM THE MORAL NORMS OF 
SOCIETY. A PARENT INFLUENCES A CHILD FOR GOOD OR BAD; SOME 
OF THAT INFLUENCE COMES FROM THE CHILD'S OBSERVATIONS OF THE 
PARENT'S BEHAVIOR. FOR THESE REASONS; THE COURT FINDS THAT 
PLAINTIFF'S BEHAVIORS AND ATTITUDES; WITH RESPECT TO NOT 
PAYING CHILD SUPPORT; ARE NOT A PROPER EXAMPLE FOR HIS CHILD 
AND THAT UNTIL PLAINTIFF ADOPTS AN ATTITUDE; MANIFEST BY 
APPROPRIATE BEHAVIOR; THAT HE RESPECT TNE LEGAL SYSTEM AND 
INTENDS TO CONFORM WITH THE LAWS OF THIS STATE AND THE 
DIRECTIVES OF THE COURT; HE SHOULD NOT HAVE PERSONAL CONTACT 
WITH HIS DAUGHTER.". (FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF 
LAW RE: JANUARY 9; 1991 ORDER). 
IT IS CLEAR FROM THIS PORTION OF THE FINDING OF FACT 
THAT JUDGE SAWAYA IS PUNISHING THE PETITIONER FOR HIS 
DISRESPECT AND ATTITUDES TOWARDS THE GOVERNMENT; COURTS AND 
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LEGAL SYSTEM. HOW AN ORDER CAN MORE CLEARLY VIOLATE THE 
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO PROTEST AGAINST THE GOVERNMENT IS 
IMPOSSIBLE TO DETERMINE. ALTHOUGH PETITIONER CONTENDS 
HE DOES NOT HAVE SUCH ATTITUDES AND BEHAVIORS. IF HE DID, IT 
IS HIS CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO HAVE SUCH AND TO DEMONSTRATE 
THOSE BELIEF AND ATTITUDES AGAINST THE GOVERNMENT AND TEACH 
HIS,CHILDREN THOSE SAME ATTITUDES AND BELIEFS. TO PUNISH FOR 
SUCH ATTITUDES AND BEHAVIORS ARE UNACCEPTABLE IN THIS 
COUNTRY! THEREFORE; ANY ORDER THAT PUNISHES FOR SUCH REASON 
MUST BE OVERTURNED. 
5. THE PETITIONER CONTENDS THAT REASONING USED BY JUDGE 
SAWAYA IS ERRONEOUS IN THAT HE COMMIT THE LOGICAL FALLACY OF 
HASTY GENERALIZATION. "TO INFER THAT ALL A IS B FROM ONE 
INSTANCES OF A BEING B IS FALLACIOUS UNLESS THE A IS KNOWN 
TO REPRESENTATIVE OF ALL A'S". FUNDAMENTALS OF LOGIC, JAMES 
D. CARNEY AND RICHARD K. SCHEER, PAGE 41. JUDGE SAWAYA 
ARGUMENT IS PLAINTIFF DOES NOT PAY CHILD SUPPORT, THEREFORE 
HE DOES NOT INPART RESPECT THE LEGAL SYSTEM OR THE LAW 
REQUIRING PAYMENT OF CHILD SUPPORT, THEREFORE HIS ATTITUDES 
AND BEHAVIORS ARE ANTI-SOCIAL, THEREFORE HIS SHOULD NOT HAVE 
ANY CONTACT WITH HIS CHILD. THE ARE SEVERAL REASON FOR NOT 
PAYING CHILD SUPPORT THAT HAVE NOTHING TO DO WITH RESPECT 
FOR THE GOVERNMENT. NOT HAVING RESPECT FOR THE GOVERNMENT 
DOES NOT MAKE ONE ANTI-SOCIAL. No WHERE DOES JUDGE SAWAYA 
CONTENDS THAT THE CHILD HAS ANY KNOWLEDGE OF HER FATHER 
NONPAYMENT OF CHILD SUPPORT NOR THAT SUCH KNOWLEDGE IS 
EFFECTING HER. SiMPLY PUT JUDGE SAWAYA LOGIC DOES NOT 
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SUPPORT HIS ORDER AND THEREFORE FOR THAT REASON ALONE IT 
SHOULD BE OVERTURNED. 
6. THE PETITIONER CONTENDS THAT JENSEN )u SCWENDIMAN, 
744 P.2D 1026 (UTAH CT. APP. 1987) CRITERIA DOES NOT APPLY 
IN THIS CASE FOR THE FOLLOWING REASON. 
THAT JENSEN IS A CASE THAT INVOLVES THE APPEAL OF A 
DRIVING UNDER THE INFLUENCE CONVICTION AND DENIAL OF DRIVING 
P R I V I L E G E S I WHERE SOCIETY HAS A RIGHT TO PROTECT ITS SELF 
FROM DRUNK DRIVERS; THEREFORE THE CRITERIA REQUIRES A 
STRONGER SHOWING OF SUCCESS THEN THE CASE AT BAR BECAUSE IT 
IS JUST THE OPPOSITE HEREI WE HAVE A HARM BEING DONE BY NOT 
GRANTING THE STAY IN THAT THE PARENT"CHILD RELATIONSHIP; A 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTED RIGHT; IS BEING DESTROYED BY THE 
DENIAL OF SAID STAY. 
7. THE PETITIONER CONTENDS THAT HE HAS MADE A STRONG 
SHOWING OF SUCCESS ON THE MERITS IN THIS CASE IN THAT HE HAS 
SHOWN THE ORDER TO BE UNCONSTITUTIONAL; HAS FALLACIOUS 
LOGIC; AND ISSUED BY A JUDGE THAT IS BIAS AND IS CONCERNED 
ABOUT PRESERVING HIS PRIOR ORDER THAN OF FINDING OUT WHAT IS 
IN THE BEST INTEREST OF THE CHILD. (SEE APPENDIX AFFIDAVIT 
OF BIAS AND SUPPLEMENTAL AFFIDAVIT OF BIAS). 
8. THE PETITIONER CONTENDS THAT THE COURT OF APPEALS 





I; LLOYD D. COLEY, DO HEREBY CERTIFY THAT I DELIVER A 
TRUE AND CORRECT COPY OF THE PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI 
TO THE OFFICE OF: 
RANDALL HOLGREM 
50 WEST BROADWAY 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 
DATED THIS 19TH DAY OF MARCH 1991. 
LLOYD D. COLEY 
APPENDIX 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
ooOoo 
Lloyd D. Coley, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
v. 
Nancy P. Coley, 
Defendant and Appellee. 
FEB.. 43991 
fJlfq/ T. Noonan 
Clerk of the Court 
Utah Court of Appeals 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
(Not For Publication) 
Case No. 900446-CA 
F I L E D 
(February 4, 1991) 
Before Judges Orme, Garff and Bench (on Law and Motion) 
This matter is before the court on a Motion To Stay 
Pending Review seeking a stay of a trial court's order dated 
January 9, 1991 denying appellant visitation with his minor 
child pending satisfaction of specified conditions. We deny 
the motion. In October, 1990, this court heard argument and 
issued an order on a previous motion to stay the July 13, 1990 
order of the Third District Court that denied appellant 
visitation with the minor child until further order of the 
trial court. This court entered the following orders, dated 
October 10, 1990: 
1. That those provisions of the July 
13, 1990 order denying appellant 
visitation and contact with the parties' 
minor child are vacated, subject to the 
further order of the trial court entered 
pursuant to this order. 
2. That [the] case is temporarily 
remanded to the trial court for entry of 
an order on visitation supported by (1) 
factual findings as to the welfare of the 
child, as required by Utah Code Ann. 
§ 30-3-5(4) (1989) and Rohr v. Rohr, 709 
P.2d 382, 383 (Utah 1985), and (2) 
provisions as to the specific acts 
required of appellant to obtain an order 
reinstating visitation and contact 
privileges. 
3. That this court retains 
jurisdiction to review any order of the 
trial court entered pursuant to this 
order during the pending appeal and 
appellant shall not be required to file 
an additional notice of appeal or pay-
additional filing fees. 
On December 11, 1990 the trial court entered Findings of 
Fact and Conclusions of Law pursuant to the provisions of this 
court's October 10, 1990 order set forth above. The findings 
are based upon the evidence presented at the hearings in 
September 1988 and June 1990, the trial court record and the 
attitude and demeanor of appellant in court proceedings. The 
findings specify the trial court's factual basis for denying 
visitation and set forth the prerequisites for reestablishing 
visitation. The court found that appellant is in arrears in 
child support in the amount of $27,305.00. Based upon the 
factual findings, the trial court concludes: 
The plaintiff's conduct, in not paying 
child support . . . is willful and 
contumacious within the meaning of Rohr 
v. Rohr, 709 P.2d 382 (Utah 1985). Based 
on the foregoing Findings of Fact, the 
court concludes that it is not in the 
best interest of the minor child to have 
visitation with the plaintiff until such 
time as plaintiff shows to this court 
that he is concerned about the child's 
financial support and expresses that 
concern by paying his ongoing child 
support in the amount of $250 per month 
and making a monthly reduction of $200 
toward the reduction of the judgments 
(child support, interest, and attorney 
fees) and makes both payments every month 
for a period of four (4) consecutive 
months. The court believes that if the 
plaintiff makes a serious effort to 
support his child financially and 
sustains that effort over a period of 
time, he will thereby demonstrate 
rehabilitation of the attitude and 
behavior defects, identified above, that 
led this court to deny plaintiff 
visitation and contact with the minor 
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child. If plaintiff thereafter fails to 
make such payments, without making a 
clear showing of changed circumstances, 
the court shall, without further hearing, 
suspend visitation. 
Appellant now seeks a stay of the December, 1990 order as 
supported by the findings of fact and conclusions of law 
entered pursuant to this court's temporary remand. The issue 
before this court is whether appellant is entitled to a stay 
pending appeal under the criteria set forth in Jensen v. 
Schwendiman, 744 P.2d 1026 (Utah Ct. App. 1987). Under Rule 
8(a) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure as interpreted in 
Jensen v. Schwendiman, a party seeking a stay must (a) make a 
strong showing that he is likely to succeed on the merits of 
the appeal; (b) establish that unless a stay is granted he will 
suffer irreparable injury; (c) show that no substantial harm 
will come to other interested parties; and (d) show that a stay 
would do no harm to the public interest. Jensen. 744 P.2d at 
1027. 
Appellant first argues that the trial court erred in 
amending its July order because such amendment must have been 
done within ten days under Utah R. App. P. 52(b) and 59. This 
argument is wholly meritless since the amendment was pursuant 
to a specific remand of this court. Appellant further claims 
that the amended order is not in conformity with this court's 
October 1990 order or Rohr v. Rohr, disputes the factual 
findings, asserts that the trial court was required to hold a 
further evidentiary hearing, and apparently claims that the 
finding that he has shown disrespect for the court system 
inhibits appellant's constitutional right of free speech. 
Appellant argues generally that this case is distinguishable 
from Rohr. 
Based on our review of the findings of fact and 
conclusions of law and appellant's arguments summarized above, 
we conclude that appellant has failed to make an adequate 
showing that he is likely to succeed on the merits and is not 
entitled to a stay on that basis. Appellant has failed to 
specifically address the remaining criteria of Jensen, and we 
do not address them in detail. This court recognizes that 
deprivation of visitation for failure to provide financial 
support is an extreme remedy requiring a trial court to conform 
with the criteria set forth in Rohr v. Rohr and to balance the 
potential harm to the parent/child relationship with the 
potential harm to the child from the willful failure to provide 
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financial support. The ultimate determination of whether the 
trial court in this case has satisfied those requirements is 
reserved for plenary presentation and consideration of this 
case. We rule, however, that appellant has failed to satisfy 
the burden of establishing his entitlement to a stay pending 
appeal under the circumstances of this case, which include the 
availability of a mechanism for purging contempt and 
reestablishing contact and visitation. The motion for further 
stay pending appeal is denied. 
One additional point requires clarification. Appellant 
asserts that this court held that "appellant may review 
subsequent orders in these proceedings without a new notice of 
appeals or additional filing fees." The October 10, 1990 order 
provided only that this court retained jurisdiction to review 
orders entered pursuant to the temporary remand. Appellant is, 
accordingly, not required to file a notice of appeal or 
additional filing fee to obtain review of the December, 1990 
order entered pursuant to remand. Any subsequent appeals of 
unrelated orders, including judgments for arrearages or 
contempt, are subject to all appellate rules and requirements. 
ALL CONCUR: 
ft-U*#Cl ^ ^ s » ^ C 
Russell W. Bench, Judge 
Ltoyd D. Cote,y, VKO Se, 
T06 5 Lahe, Stn.e,eA 
Satt Lahe, Ctty, Utah, 84 705 
Phono.: 363-7029 
~». ?r\ 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR SALT LAKE COUWTy 
STATE OF UTAH i , . ... ^ ,„„ 
^'i'Ljj—v'_p'> pjj 'gn 
LLoyD D. COLEY, 
PZcUjvti44, - . s . sf 
MAwcy P. coLEV, 
AFFIDAVIT OF B I A S i i ^ ^ & , £ OR PREJUDICE ( ^ ^L«^— 
Co^e Mo^  D ST 5 T 26 
Jadge, Jamex S. Sawaya 
COMES WOW, Ltoyd D, Cote.y, ptaJuvbi44 in the, above, mattest 
and maheJ* the. ioVLowtng A^tdavtt o£ JOJO^ o t Pn,e,jadtce, 
agaJuu^t Judge, Jame-6 S Sawaya, -tlte 0Lt^tgne,d jadge, in the, above, 
matter,. Th^&> a^£tdav<UL -c-6 made an.de*, CttaA Ra£e4 o^ C>cv-6^  
P^oaedate numbzst, 63 ( 6 ) . ThX^ alH-davtt i^> made, be,cjauAe. o4 
the, toZZowing Atatzmejitt, ac£>ton^6 and otdet-* made 6y Jadge 
Jame-6 S. Sawaya dusttng the, ^honX time, tie, ha* 6ee/t *>te Jadge 
Pte^btding ove,n, the, above, mattesi. 
STATEMENTS 
HEARING ON OCTOBER 3, T9S8 
" • • .<tA.e c o a t £ can. mahe, tt%-& own motton and hexLn, t t at 
the. end o£ the, caJkendan,. " 
"you, tooh tihe, you, havejn't mi^^e,d any mexxJU*. . . " 
"I'm teJULuig you. nXght now we, a t e going to geX you, on a 
paying ba^t* uunte^A you. want to AesLve, the, n.eJ>t o£ tho^e. 
ntne, y e a t ^ In the. County Ja-Lt." 
REVIEW HEARING ON JANUARY 9, 79S9 
"I want yoa to g e t thU> women />ome, mone.y even. i4 you. 
onos>w 
have to go out and bon.n,ow It. . . " 
HEARING ON MAY 21, 1990. 
"I know cutd you, know everybody know* what1 * going on In 
thl* <UL*e. " 
HEARING ON JUNE U, 1990 
"1 know what*A gotng on In thl* ca*e9 ju*t call youn, 
iln^t wltn<L**." 
"li we wen,e not Xjn thl* COUAX n,oom I would have, a iew 
won,d* to *ay to thl* man.." 
"...two handled and ility dollar* *hould not be a 
problem ion, a ionJty-tjwo yean, old man. . ." 
"you, do not need to continue to come, back to thl* counX 
I'll n,evlew thl* matter inborn time to time and let you 
know what happening In thl* matten.. " 
ARGUMENT 
The *tatement* recited hen,e demon*tnjate* the obvlou* 
bla* oi Judge Sawaya. Some an,e *eli evident white othei* 
n,equlsce* *ome explaining. When a Judge make* a comment like 
the "count can make It own motion*" and then proceed* to hean. 
that motion It become lmpo**lble that ion, an opponent to 
pn,epan,e a do^en*e to *uch motion* iwvthen. It take* the CounX* 
in,om a unbla* position to that oi a pn,o*ecuton, and judge at 
the *ame time. Oun, *y*tem oi justice doe* not allow ion, that 
kind oi Judalcal conduct. Not only doe* It *how bla* but It 
al*o *how a dl*n,e*pect ion, the *y*tem* oi njjJie* by which we 
govern oun, *oclety. 
When a judge can *et a*lde the njule* and pnxtctlce hi* 
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own bnxind oi ja*ttce he becomes won^te than tho*e he t* to 
pn,e*tde oue^t, ion. he ha* *won.n an oath to up hotd tho*e nvJLe* 
arid to *o iatnJLy and we mu*t KoJLy on tho*e who*e duty tt t* 
to judge* iatnJty on, the *y*tem woutd pesit*h. 
It non-pn,oieA>*tonaJl and njude ion. a, Judge to medio, a 
comment* n,egan.dtng the, phy*tcaJL appeanxmce oi a Ztttgant 
whether they bo, complementary on, degnjadtng a* tn tht* cxi*e. 
Judged have no nXght to make* thn,eat* that an,e 
nonenion,cexx.bte not onty doe* t t *how the, judge*' butting 
aJJLUjude*, t t t* akin to the, cahoot yan,d butty *aytng "I'tt 
nXp ion, iace oii" neAXhen. one, t* beZtevabte. A* tn the. 
comment* tt*ted " . . .*en,ve the, n,e*t oi tho*e nine yean^> in 
the, County Jatt.". 
To *u.gge*t on, demand to a pest*on who t* havtng tn,oubte 
paying *upponX payment and ha* a motton to n,educe *ai,d 
payment, to bonsiow money *how* no understanding oi the, 
pn,obtem. How can bonscowtng money, even i.i po**tbte} do 
anything bat compound the. pn,obtem. 
One, oi the, mo*t damaging comment* made, howeven, i* the, 
comment "that everybody know* what gotng on'* ja*t be^on.e 
Jadge Sajwaya t**ue* a no-batt wainxmt ion, my ann,e*t. The. 
pn.obi.em hen.e that, Judge Sawaya knejw that, I had been in hi* 
Count and he. wa* pn.e*ent when hi* ctenh totd me. that ondesi 
needed to be n,e*en,ved. Not onty did Judge Sawaya know that I 
had appealed on the Qn.de*. to Show Couu*e> but, John Rachen,, my 
aXtonjtey, *ent Hay Stoddand to appear, and Inionm the count 
thaX we coutd be In coanX In ititeen minuet*. Judge Sajwaya 
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n o n o o o 
then made tho*e comment* and l**ued the wannant. 
In the heanJung on June 1i, 1990, when the opposing 
coan*et *tood to mahe hi* opening KQjnanh* Judge Sau/aya *aXd 
" I know what9* going on In thU> ca*e ju*t CJOJUL youn, 4ln*t 
wltne**." It appear* 4n,om thl* comment no matten, what 
evidence woutd be pn,e*cnted Judge Sawaya ha* atn,oyady made up 
hi* mind a* to the outcome o4 thl* heanjjng. Thl* I* 4unAhe** 
demon*tnatoA by the othen. comment* tinted above, panXlcatanJiy 
the eomment "14 we wete not In thl* counAsioom I woutd have a 
4eu) things to -6cu/ to thl* man" a eomment not uncommon to bast 
n,oom tath whence men ate trying to display theln, pn,owe**, 
o^ten chcUULenglng each othen, to a ilght. 
Again the comment "two handled and 4Hty dottasi* *houtd 
not be a piobtem 4 on, a 42 yean, otd man" thl* comment ImpJLle* 
that being *hont o4 4cutd-6 on, by having ilnxxjnclat dl^ileuJLtleA 
dl*attow* one to be a man. 
When I n,e4ensted to a payment made to the defendant o4 
4lve hundred dottasi*, (copies o4 the endot*ed check* an,e 
ln,cto*ed) , the defendant*' attonjney totd tite counX that then,e 
had not been even one penny paid to the defendant In oven, 
4lve yeast*. I totd the counX that Mt. Hotgn,em argued In the 
tevleia In January o4 79S9 that the live hundred dottan, 
payment WOL* not Au^ilclent to pustge the contempt. Judge 
Sawaya *aXd that he did n,ecatt anything about the payment, 
thl* then give* gn.eat concensi because It mean* that Judge 
Sawaya committed me to jolt 4 on, thlsity day* white IgnonJung 
the payment* made to the defendant. Thl* I* a ltta*tnaXlon 
4 
rinn^^m 
o4 UiULd U)e^>t Justice.; ion,geX the, nxxJLe^> "teX ju*t hang' im' " . 
FlnaXty Judge, Sawaya wiXh a commerX o£ "Vou ne.e.d not 
continue, to come, bach to th&> counX. I'ZZ n,cvlejw thl* mattest 
4n,om time, to time, and teX you, know what'* happening In thl* 
mattest." Th<U> comment 4>how* Judge, Sawaya*' wlttlngne^>* to 
iuXty aA^ume, the defendant*' ca^e,, pn,o<6e,cute, XX
 % judge ltf 
and then. panlAh the, ptalntl44 • I can Ace, no dl^tesiejit beXwcejt 
lodge. Sawaya*' dlctatonXat justice, and that oj> Hl&tesiA' on, 
the. Communist n,eglme.. 
ACTIONS 
HEARING ON OCTOBER 3, 1988 
1. AVLoweA a On,desi to Show Cauu^e, heasilng to tahe, piece, 
whejn: 
a) Theste, u;a-6 not pn,opest ^e^volce. non, ^uHlcXent notice, to 
the, ptaXntl^i o4 the, nature, oi the, proceedings. 
b) The sesvotce o£ pn.oceX4 a;cu6 4>en.vexL by the. Defendant' <*> 
atXonjney. 
c) Judge, Sawaya made, his own motion and set It 4 on, 
heanXng on the, same day, which motion Included jaUi time, not 
ashed ton, In the, defendant's motion. 
d) Judge. Sawaya did not aJULow ptaXntlii any time, to 
pn.epan,e ton. Sold heanXng. 
e) When the, counX had onden, that the, Issue oi contempt 
on sold la\Jbun,e to pay be, n,exesi,ved untlt a tnXat on 
pZalntl44'<t> Petition to MocU^y T>ecn,ee o4 Vlvon.ce, be. hean,d. 
sold onxlen, was stgned by Judge, Sawaya on the. 2 2nd day o4 
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ApsuJL 19&6. The, tsiasJt haA not oc,euxstst,e.d. 
4 ) I-6-6aed a Contempt Oddest. e.x.ce>t><6tveJ,y vagae, oa £/te 
QaG^6^coa oi how tfte ptatnttli couJLd pusige, htm^eJU o4 
contempt. 
REVIEW HEARING ON JANUARY 23id, 19*9. 
Judge, Sawaya ts^^ueA a commttme,nt ion. pZaAstttii to the. 
Satt Lahe, County JaJJL whest the. on.desi o4 the, Cousit, on ttA> 
lace., gave, the. p&atntMt until Fcbnjuuasty 14th, 7 9 89 to pustge. 
htm^e.14 o4 *outd contejnpt. 
HEARING ON MAY I1*t 1990. 
I-6-6acd a "no bolt" bench wansuutt 4 on. the. plassitl44 whest 
the, plalntl44 dXA not appea led on May 11 <bt. 1990. But. the. 
pJtatntt44 did app exist at the. time, and date. o4 the* On.desi to 
Show Caa^e. that was> ^estved apon him and was* totd by the. cXestK 
o4 the. c o a ^ t , In the. pn,es>ejvce, o4 Judge. Sawaya, that the. Oldest, 
to Show Caiu>e, had be,esi cancelled and would have, to be, n,e^>esived 
upon htm. Jadge. Sawaya did not n,e,call Aald wastsuxxit until the, 
plalntl44 pn.ovlde,d a copy o4 the. counst minuter o44 the, 
computest showing that the. Oldest, to Show Causae. w<u> canceled 
and a leJitest 4n,om plalntl44 '* aJttonjney e,x,plalnlng the. action* 
o4 the. plalntl44 • 
Totd both the, attonjne.y* In the. cas>e. that the. Oldest to 
Show Cauue, would be. continue, without the. need 4 on, the. 
plculntl44 to be. Aesived. The. oilglnaJL Oldest, to Show C<uu6e wast* 
l*4u,e,d directing the. plalntl44 to Comml^Alonest, VexxJLest, and 
not Judge, Sawaya. 
HEARING ON JUNE 1Bth 1990 
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t<6*aed a Contempt Oddest ex,ce**tvety vagae. on the question 
o4 fiow the pZatnti44 coaJLd pun,ge htm*e£4 o£ contempt. 
ORDERS 
ORDER OE DECEMBER 16th 79S9• 
ThsU> on,den* t* tn cont&tct with the on/dost of> Sept. 2 2 , 
T9S6 • 
ORDER OE JUNE 1ith 1990. 
Tht* onAen, dente* vt*ttatton nXght* pusie&y on the 
giound* o£ non-payment o4 chttd *apponX when even Jadge 
Sawaya admtt* tn the hexxsiAjng that the be*t tnten.e^>t o4 the 
chJUid t* to have vtAttatton wtth host, Youthen*. No oja*e Houw etui 
bo, iouund whence vt*ttatton nXght* WQSLC dojny onty ion, non-
payment o£ chttd Auppont. 
Eon. the above mentioned n,ea*on and iactb, Jadge Souwaya 
Ahoa&d be removed 4torn tht* ca*e ion. ht* showing oj> Bta* and 
Vn,ejudtce against me and a dtiien^ent lodge appointed. 
Tint* ha* been a dtiltcatt acton ion, me to take. My 
attonjney doe* not agn.ee wtth tt, and we have *pent much ttme 
debating t t . He ha* totd me he woatd wtthdnjuw a* my attorney 
14 I itted tht* a^itavtt. It goe* agatnbt my boJitei that 
Jadge an,e tmpasittxxJL and 4att} and that we *houtd accept thetn, 
dect*tonf bat when Judge Sawaya dectded to deny my vt*ttoutton 
wtth Lausia t t not onJLy punt*he* me bat tt aJL*o deny* hen, 
Ktght* to hen. iathe**' tove and attention. Thence WCL* not one 
*tngte panXtcHe o4 evtdence o4£en,ed to juutt^y the denlat o£ 
vt*ttatton othen, than the nonpayment ol chttd *apponX. Jadge 
Sawaya*9 actton demand* tevtew and ht* n,emovaJL £n,om tht* ca*e 
7 
and 4O*L<IQ^> me to mahe, tht* a44<ldavtt. 
CERTIFICATION 
I HEREBy CERTIFy THAT I futve / tead thci j>OK<Lgoing 
Aiitdavtt oi ViQ.}wdt<xz, and that I andosu>tand the 
x,e,pn,zAentaJbton6 and in^onmatton contatned thestoXn and that 
&aXd tnioimatton and n,epA,o^ojitati.on6 cLte ttu,e and accurate to 
the bo^t 04 my knowledge and betted . I aJU>o cositt^y that thX^> 
kiitdavXJL oi psL&juAt&e, t* not made ion, the potpo^e o4 detay 
and Vt> made in good ioXth. 
DATEV thl* 16th day ot Juuty, !<&& 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWOKN TO belote me, a Notary Vabtte on 
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Judge, Jamais S . Sawaya 
COMES NOLO, Lloyd V. Cote,y, p ^ a - u i ^ u ^ -CM the, above, matt-e^t 
artd makd~6 the, 4oULow<cng Sapple,me,nta,l A^tdavtt o^ BAJJU> on, 
psi&judtce, agaXn^t J a d g e Jame^> S Seaway a, the, a-6^tgne,d j (judge, tn 
the, above, matter. Tn,L* a^iXdav-Lt t^> made and en. Utah, RuUto^ o-h 
CLvli PioccduLte. nambesi 63 ( 6 ) . 7"fu^6 a ^ - t d a i / t t tt> made, be^cxuu>e, 
04 the, ^otlowtng ^^xite.me,nt^>, act-coru> a>td o-tde^-6 made 6j/ Jadge, 
Jam<L4 S. Sawaya ^-utcie, the, fctltng o{> the, itn^t A^^tdavtt o£ 
Pie. j ad lac. 
JULY 13, 1990. 
Oti th<-t> d a t e Jadqe. Sawaua ^-cgne^d a On,de^n, on Oddest t o 
A * 
Show Caa-^e. when, pta^uittj>t> had ^lte,d a ob j cct<con to Aatdc on 
the, 11th 06 Jaty. Satd obj e.cttoru> u/e.te 4>.t£ed t a a ttmeJLy 
manne.n, and contaXne,d vaJLLd ob je,cXXon^ that, t^ a hexuiXng wesie, 
had woald be, apheJid. Fon. example.: de.^e.ndant d t d >tot gtve, 
c-n,e.alt ^o^i payme.nt patd on the, amoant o£ the, jadgejne.nt a^>he,d 
p i and 6at.d jadgo.me.nX, amoant contatne,d the, ^ame. tnteste^t 
<tn two d<L4v>cn.e,nt ptace^> on. a doable, tnte.sie.4t. 
000299 
REVIEW HEARING JULY 76, 1990. 
ladgo. Sacaaya u;a^ > ttv^oimcd oi the A44*Ldavtt o4 Bta^t cut 
the -btcvit oi the Heading. Utah1 ^ Rate* oj> Ctvtl VKOcedivuc 
*tate* that once the A^^tdavtt o<& Bta* <L6 ^tted the jadge tn 
the ca^e can proceed no ioKthei, J ltd go, Sawaya *atd that ho, 
{JOCU> not bta^ed and the'cc^oic woaZd tgnon,e tho. a^^tdavtt and 
proceed wtth tho, heaitng. Tho. lo&lowtng actton* o£ Jadge 
Sauoaya demon*tAato>6 ht* bta*. 
J. When tn^onjmed that tho. O^den, ho, had ^tgned wo* not 
^apponXed by ^tndtng* o4 tacit ho, stated that tho. £tndtng o£ 
£act WQSLQ,, tn ht* optnton, tncoKponcuted tn tho, body oj> the. 
Oddest. Jadge Sawaya wa* ovesLtatned by tho. Sapn,ojne CoanX tn a 
dtvoA,ce ca^e ^ o t commttttng a man to jatl Ion, contojnpt when 
thence wesce no ^tndtng* o£ ^act tn that ccu>e. 
2 . When Ahown that p-too^ o^ payment UJO* made to tho, 
defendant
 y and then,Q^on,e tho. ostdosi ho, had ^tgned wo* tn osteon, 
tn tho. amoant o^ tho. jadgement gnjanted, ho. stated tho. amoant 
payment wa6 tn^tgnt^tcant to tho, amoant owed and the'ee^^e* 
nothtng need bo, do no. to connect tho. jadgement. 
3. Jadge Sawaya appasi,ent£y dtd not ca^te that defendant 
and defendant*4 coan^eJt itted ioJL^e aUtdavtt* tn KegaKd* to 
a $500.00 payment that u;a-6 dented by thorn because ho* *atd the 
amoant t* tn-btgnt^tcant. 
4. Attest, a payment o^ $500.00 ho* Ke^a^e to any contact 
wAjut my aaagh^cesi o^Ken, than aJUiowAjig mo* to axJUL my daughter 
j^cz^on at zne a ^ e a a a / i t . 
2 
5 . Qn,d<zn. me to neg-ui paying $7 5.0 0 a u/cch no tlvd 
dd^dndanz on. go to jatt ana tkdn -6chcdu£cd a ^eu-ccu; tn ^-oc-ty 
day 6 . 
ARGUMENT 
Tkc U t a h S a p t a m c Cou. i t tn A a c t e ^ e n u . Ana a t >>en a 19 62 
ca^a* wite^G an A^4 Ldav-i t 0$ BixL*> wa-6 o c£ed and tnd J u d g e 
p r o c e e d e d on m e ca->,e , bzaiad that tkd v e i y ^act tkaz t h e 
, ' a a g a d td not ^oHiow tka m £ c , a>> d c d Satuaya zn tlvL6 ca^>a, 
wa-6 e v - t d e n c e 0{> 6-ta>> " T a c i t may 6a mcAU en an asigamcint that 
-6ucn a l e^a^a fc t o co/npey tx;>cth a t a £ e m^tgnt 6e t n d - i c a t t v e o-o 
t h e a>>>>CTtea p^cj 'ud<Lce; artd ^omawliat dd)7 io iu t ia td>s t h e cut^>dom 
o^ t h e r ia£e t t ^ c (?.{)." 
J u d g e SoAoaya conttnan-d a c t i o n d e m o / u s t a a t e a i>cty icxUl 
o c a 6 a n d p i e j u d c c e e v e n tkoagk h e >6taxe-4 h e c-4 n o t 6-ca->>cd oa 
p r e j u d i c e d 1 e a n n o t -6ee /IOU; a n y jadgd coald bkow mosta. 
p i c * u d c c e a n d 6 ca^> t h a n J u d g e Satoaya ka^. The 6e-6t t h a t c a n 
6 e -6acd 04 J u d g e Sawaya' t> actton-6 u6 that h e may n o t 6 c 
psi&jadzcdd a g a c n ^ t mc 6 a t t h a t t h e 6-ta^ ^ 6 agatn^t pdop&d who 
do not pay theAsc ^appon^t obl-cgoutton^, t-6 that C4 tnjad thdn 
Jadga. Sawaya act-ton^> a i e e v e n mo^te dep£o>ia6.£e , ^o>i -l-t m e a / u 
that a J a d g e c a n dhoo-^o. any typo. o$ o^dndd^i and ddny thoAsi 
^uugnz-6 to a ^aisi tdgat pn.odd^^> juu>t bddao6d thd o^^dn^d t^ 
ond that h e ^Q.QJL6 pasitzdatan,Ly ^tn^ong a 6 o a t . It t^> a woJLt 
known ^ac-t tkat ptdjadzddd vdoptd bd-tzdvd thdm^oJi\jd^ not to 
6 e p i c / a d - l c e d a^ > ddmon>>t>iatdd tn Clvtl Rtglvt^ Actcon-6 dasvtng 
thd 6-oc-ttc 4 . K u t e t tAadaoK and G e o r g e CUaX£aec, tthd J ad go. 
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Satoaya, a^td not 6 e U c u e thojn^ztvdh to a p ^ e j t u i - t c e d p<L*U>on. 
CErriFICATIOM 
I HEKEhy :ER7"IFv Tt^AT I Ixavz 'iQjad thd ioicgolng 
Ati) -cdavA^z od psuLjadccc and tnxut I andz^^tana t / t c 
^ep't<^6ef^tax•cor!-<6 atxd -CRO u^mat-ton CLorvta^iXdd tlx&'iaux and that, 
AOA^d <LnAO*imaz.sLon and rKLpx<L*>Q.ntOLZ<Lon* ate i t a e ana adaxmxLtz, no 
tho. r><> *>t otj my nnoivtcduz CL/IC/ 6e£-t<26 . I a € 6 0 cG-^t-c^y thaut th^L6 
Ait taavLn 04 P^djuud^Ldx -t i, not mado. 4 0 * t / i e p i u t p o ^ e o-^  doJLay 
and t^ > mad(i ux gooa y c u m . 
VATEl t / i t * JOth day 04 July > J9 9<0. 
L£oyd P . Colony, 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO bd^o^KL m<L, a Notary Pablld on 
titd 1 btlx day o{> JvJly > 1990. 
r
- ^ Q \ w ^ ^ ^ ^ M , o 
Nozaiy Pabllc 
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